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ABSTRACT: The principle of creativity constitutes a central point in the philosophical-
anthropological as much as in the psychoanalytic work of the Greek philosopher Cornelius 
Castoriadis. In Castoriadis’s thought the creative praxis of the human being is dependent on 
the innate imaginary force. The purpose of this article is to elaborate the way that subjectivity 
and the social field are constituted and interconnected through the unfolding of two 
fundamental concepts of Castoriadis, the radical imagination which applies to the psyche and the 
social imaginary significations which applies to the social. The text aims to point out that 
Castoriadis’s intention was to make thinkable the content of autonomy in psychoanalytic terms 
of an “exchange” between the conscious and the unconscious that unleashes the creative 
potentiality of the psyche, and also becomes a precondition of political autonomy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This article is focused on Castoriadis’s fundamental psychoanalytic account of the 
individual which I correlate with his philosophical-anthropological approach. The 
main idea in Castoriadis’s analysis is the human being as a subjectivity with the ability 
to constitute its own essential quality. This implies that if the human being is to be seen 
as characterized by  some kind of “essence”, this essence should not be understood  as a  
preexistent, solid identity, but instead as an innate principle of creativity which ascribes  
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to the person the ability of auto-poiesis or self-constitution.1 This understanding has to 
be seen in relation to a certain degree of indeterminacy which is fundamental in the 
Castoriadic ontology.  
The present analysis aims to show that Castoriadis’s focus on the creative potential 
of the subjectivity does not overlook the deluded or irrational aspect of the human 
being, and is not expressed as a romanticized affirmation of positivity, as it has 
sometimes been maintained.2 In comparison to Lacan who stresses the alienating 
aspect of every social construction and inherent human limitations, Castoriadis aims to 
bridge the chasm between the individual and the social. His purpose is exactly to 
create the conceptual conditions for recovering from the dualism that is partly brought 
about by people’s alienation from social creation and partly by their psychological 
inclinations. However, the connection between the psyche and the social can neither 
be interpreted in terms of identification or holism. Castoriadis intends to articulate the 
terms and conditions of a possible exodus of the conditions of heteronomy in a two-fold 
perspective that applies to the individual and the social. Since the imaginative capacity 
is tightly connected to the innate creative principle of the human being, and it serves as 
a catalyst for its manifestation, Castoriadis uses two terms to refer respectively to the 
imaginary forces of the individual and the social, the radical imaginary and the social 
imaginary. In this article I examine the ways in which these two aspects interact in the 
development of the individual psyche, and the terms under which they can both be 
analyzed in respect to the project of autonomy.  
My position is that Castoriadis’s approach of an inherent principle of creativity does 
not stem from a naïve idealism. It is rather founded on his interpretation of the 
psychoanalytic imperative, and I claim that it is in this context that he could possibly 
be better understood. I suggest that autonomy in psychoanalytic terms for Castoriadis 
is articulated in terms of a reversal between the unfolding of conscious and unconscious 
processes and mental activity. Castoriadis’s understanding of autonomy as a process of 
elucidation and praxis which aims to liberate from the unconscious determinism, as 
well as from the domination of the ‘conscious’ mind over the unconscious, can be also 
examined as Castoriadis’s critique or  reconsideration of the hierarchical 
psychoanalytic structure which is established by Freud.   
                                                          
1 C. Castoriadis, Anthropology, Politics, Philosophy (Ανθρωπολογία, Πολιτική, Φιλοσοφία), Athens: Ιpsilon, 
2001, pp. 138-154. 
2 See Y. Staurakakis, The Lacanian Left, Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2007, p. 17. 
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IN BETWEEN THE RADICAL IMAGINATION AND THE SOCIAL 
IMAGINARY 
The ontological principle of intrinsic creativity on which Castoriadis’s anthropology is 
based on, enables the precept of self-alteration to take place as an actuality empowered 
by the force of imaginary. Being altered thus signifies not just a possibility for the 
human being but the necessary process of generating meaning which itself enables the 
being to become, and sustains  it in a process of a continuous becoming. The principle of 
the poietical activity that permits the human being to be altered serves as a carrier of 
meaning and becomes a never ending process that gives shape to the individual as a 
kind of permanent potentiality. 
The above process involves an ability of enclosing otherness into the concept of the 
self, as Castoriadis puts it. This is the point where psychoanalysis is introduced in this 
philosophical inquiry. For psychoanalysis serves as a method which leads to the 
emergence of the internal otherness, and by doing so, it constitutes the precondition of 
psychic autonomy. The imperative of autonomy could be recognized as Castoriadis’s 
most characteristic and significant contribution in political philosophy. The present 
analysis aims to expound the particular way in which this idea is implemented in his 
psychoanalytic approach. Autonomy should therefore be interpreted both in political 
and psychological terms. It is my intention to reflect upon, and expound , how in 
Castoriadis’s philosophy the individual autonomy is connected to social autonomy.  
In political philosophy and mostly in macro-politics the emphasis is usually put on 
the individual’s dependence on the social, to the extent that a person is being formed 
through constitution and social conditions. This is the reason why  in political and 
revolutionary theory it has been stressed so far the necessity of a constitutional change, 
but so little has been said on the necessity of the subject’s transformation in the form  of 
a political imperative. However, it should  be noted that the reason for bringing 
together psychoanalysis and political thought is exactly to demonstrate that politics 
should not be understood in reference to a unilateral dependence of the individual 
upon the social. In Castoriadis’s thought the subject’s singularity is acknowledged as a 
prerequisite for  the social condition of  collective autonomy. Castoriadis makes clear that 
the essential  progress  of the analytical process depends on the attainment of a degree 
of autonomy. The psychic autonomy appears  as  a deeply  political concept if analyzed  
in a twofold way: as personal autonomy from the control applied by the unconscious 
mechanisms, and as autonomy from the imposed social norm and dominion. 
Autonomy, therefore, concerns the capability of deconstructing - and going beyond - 
the established social framework which shapes the conditions of heteronomous bios, a 
predetermined and contained form of life.  
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Castoriadis’s aspiration to bring together political philosophy and psychoanalysis 
can be seen as corresponding to the emancipating aspirations of thinkers like Herbert 
Marcuse, one of the pioneers of the Freudo-Marxist movement who belonged to the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Marcuse focuses on the contradiction between 
the two Freudian principles, the pleasure principle and the reality principle, in the 
capitalist context, and the role of technical rationality in organizing the modern 
hierarchical society, production, administration and suppressive societal mechanisms3. 
His analysis of repression within capitalism is mostly associated with Freud’s critique of 
civilization and his criticism is characterized by the radicalization of Hegelian 
dialectical thinking4. However, Marcuse’s critique of both Freud and Marx remains still 
within the Freudo-Marxist perspective. Castoriadis’s critique of Marx goes even further 
leading to radical negation. Castoriadis’s break with the Marxist tradition gives rise to 
the imperative of autonomy in terms of both individual and collective life. Marx’s 
account of history as a linear progressive process and his inability to develop a critique 
of technique, were two factors that led Castoriadis to overcome Marxism. Although 
Marx consistently criticized the inhuman conditions of work in capitalist factories, he 
failed to question the way factories were organized, the implied rationality of such 
organization and the form of technique, and took them as granted. According to 
Castoriadis, it was Marx’s specific concept of history that inhibited the development of 
a critique of technique and its pseudo-‘rationality’, which would be fundamental 
obstacles in the establishment of an autonomous and self-governing society5.     
The two types of individual and social autonomy in Castoriadis meet in the twofold 
meaning of imaginary: the radical imagination, on the one side, applies to the imaginary 
flow of representations of the psyche, and the social imaginary significations, on the other 
side, which applies to the creation of meaning as a collective creation of the socio-
historical field. The two dimensions of imaginary are codependent since one is not 
reducible to the other, but neither one exists without the other.6 The imaginary, both 
collective and individual, is considered as a source of creation for individuals and 
societies. The world itself comes into being as a creation of the imagined world of 
signification. Therefore, Castoriadis maintains, it exists as an absolute creation: creation 
ex nihilo for it is a result of the primary social imaginary significations, though not in 
                                                          
3 See H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston: Beakon Press Books, 1974. 
4 See H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, New York: Humanity Books, 1999. 
5 C. Memos, Castoriadis and Critical Theory: Crisis, Critique and Radical Alternatives, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014, p. 85. 
6 C. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of the Society, Cambridge: The Polity Press, 1987, p. 274. 
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nihilo or cum nihilo;7 that is to say, not within nothing, not in void. In social imaginary 
there are always restrictions; however, Castoriadis insists in its undetermined character. 
The whole existence is ascribed with the unmotivated, indeterminate vis formandi which 
manifests to the individual as the libido formandi.8 Thus, Castoriadis’s ontology of 
creativity is formed as a critical approach of Freud’s solidified analysis of the Ego-
structured self, and succeeds to transcend the traditional Freudian conceptualization 
and its limitations.   
The psyche is the most dominant aspect of the human being, and in Castoriadian 
ontology is defined as the radical imaginative quality. Identified with the radical 
imagination itself, psyche is a flux of representations (Castoriadis, 1987, 255) which – 
similarly to what Freud’s analysis revealed in respect to the dominance of the pleasure 
principle – a priori resists the absolute assimilation into the real. This implies that 
reality, far from being a prefixed condition, initially manifests to the individual 
perception as an undetermined creation. On the other hand, a characteristic of psyche 
is the need for symbolic meaning that is expected to come from the social imaginative 
significance, the perpetual source of meaning for the individual. This form of meaning 
stems from what Castoriadis calls the social imaginary which takes shape as a collective 
creation. This provision is considered as necessary according to an unexpected 
anthropological estimation that goes as follows: “human beings are totally 
degenerative, crazy animals that are fundamentally incapable of surviving if they were 
left only to themselves” (Castoriadis, 2001, p. 52).9 This holdover of “unifying madness” 
for Castoriadis constitutes a unique characteristic of the human nature which  
originates from the primal solipsistic psychic core. Even if this incoherent aspect is 
likely to take the form of the adult’s rationality, still to some extent aims to a return to 
the undifferentiated condition that Freud referred to by the term oceanic feeling.  
Freud used the term oceanic to refer to the sensation of being in unification with the 
                                                          
7 Castoriadis’s ontology of creative imaginary in respect to social-historical creation ex nihilo appears to be 
in contrast to hermeneutics. However, with the extension of his comprehension of the ontological creation 
of form into nature as it is presented in the final part of ‘The Imaginary Institution of Society’, Castoriadis 
appears to expand the traditional phenomenological perspective. See S. Adams, Castoriadis’s Ontology: Being 
and Creation (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy), Fordham University Press, 2011.  
8 On creation as a fundamental ontological category in Castoriadis, see F. Ciaramelli, “The Self-
Presupposition of the Origin: Homage to Cornelius Castoriadis”, Thesis Eleven, vol. 49, no. 1, 1997, pp. 45-
67. And on the Castoriadian notion of creation as a ‘critical’ concept in contrast to the implementation of 
‘creation’ by the consumerist capitalistic society, C. De Cock, A. Rehn, D. Berry, “For a Critical 
Creativity: The Radical Imagination of Cornelius Castoriadis” in Handbook of Research on Creativity, K. 
Thomas, J. Chan (eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, pp. 150-161. 
9 Translation mine.  
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universe.10 A reference to this concept by Freud is found to a letter addressed to 
Romain Roland. Roland employs  this notion to describe the spontaneous religious 
sentiment of the eternal, which actually is not ‘perceived’, but directly experienced by 
the person as a condition of being it in a non-dual state. For him it expresses the 
religious energy that can be found in all religious systems beyond beliefs and 
ideologies. Freud used this concept to refer to a primitive ‘ego-feeling’. He uses  this 
concept to describe the infantile consciousness which has not been differentiated by the 
external environment. The undifferentiated condition of the self (or better selflessness) 
lasts, according to Freud, for the period the baby is breast-fed. This primitive ego-
feeling precedes the perception of an ego, which arises when the breast is taken away. 
This is when the ego as a separate feeling of a self arises. Nevertheless, Freud does not 
deny that the oceanic feeling as a  sense of oneness with the world might be preserved 
during maturation, due to the capacity of memory to preserve early experience in 
adulthood.11 However, Castoriadis’s approach of the oceanic does not conform to the 
Freudian, but could be said that is in a sense  compatible with Marcuse’s vision. If the 
societally imposed principle of arranging the psyche is the principle of difference, what is 
jeopardized and occasioned by the acceptance of this fact is a new adjustment which 
tends toward the longing for the primal unity that Freud describes as oceanic feeling by 
the elimination of difference but also of repression (Castoriadis, 1987, 298-300). 
Nevertheless, although this is not a matter of concern within the context of the present 
topic, I am not sure if, within their psychoanalytic perspective, not only Freud but even 
Castoriadis recognized to its actual extent the dynamic psychic aspect that the 
primordial oceanic feeling entails. This dynamic aspect manifests  through the 
unfolding of the mysterious and largely unexplored psychic powers and their 
connection to the expansion of consciousness  as it is apparent in the realizations 
embedded in the doctrines of early  ancient religions and schools of philosophy.12  
Returning to the statement of the “unifying madness”, this statement should be 
probably perceived as indicating a middle way in between optimistic views of inherent 
sociability and pessimistic views of inherent unsociability. Castoriadis founds the 
being’s ability for ex nihilo creation upon  an ontology that is contrasted to the 
Aristotelian a priori sociability, and the Socratic ideal of the soul as expressed by Plato. 
                                                          
10 S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989. 
11 W. B. Parsons, ‘‘The Freud-Rolland Correspondence’’, in The Enigma of the Oceanic Feeling: Revisioning the 
Psychoanalytic Theory of Mysticism, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 19-88. 
12 On the approach of the oceanic feeling as the source of the ancient spiritual experience: M. J. Masson, 
The Oceanic Feeling: The Origins of Religious Sentiment in Ancient India, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1980. 
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However, it can be noticed that even for the ancients, beauty and the manifestation of 
the grace of soul in the physical realm is not ensured without some prerequisites such 
as systematic exercise, self-examination and self-discipline; and that is something of 
course that pertains also to the cultivation of individuals by means of the polis or the 
community. For Aristotle virtue is elective habitus (ἔξις προαιρετική).13 While in Plato’s 
dualistic description of the soul in Phaedo, the irrational aspect appears to be the bipolar 
of the rational, and the latter is considered as that which enables self-government.14 On 
the other hand, Castoriadis’s negative ontological statement does neither resemble the 
pessimistic Hobbesian view of the unsocial human being, nor does it lead to 
conservative political suggestions. In either case, many could be said on what is carried 
along by a human being when it comes to life (contrasting views relevant to the 
platonic concepts of memory or others of intrinsic divinity could take place), and this 
may be a good topic to be discussed elsewhere beyond the Castoriadian psychoanalytic 
context.    
According to Castoriadis’s  aforementioned statement , there is no such thing as an 
a priori of logos. The emphasis of Castoriadis on a primal irrationality, on the power of 
imaginary, and the human capacity to transcend the irrational state through imaginary 
significations juxtaposes Castoriadis to the idealistic tradition of an inherent rationality 
and sociability that is usually taken for granted. The human being is not seen as logical 
by nature, but is seen as taking birth  in the form of an irrational creature which 
‘becomes’,  it is becoming humane  through the interference of the ‘social’. Moreover, 
the human is not born with an intrinsic ability of coexistence.15 By means of institution, 
“this writhing little monster will either end up in psychotic autism, fortunately in rare 
cases, or it will become a social being.”16 Therefore, occasioned by this thesis of primal 
imperfection or even insanity, the being in the Castoriadian anthropology is heading 
towards fulfilment, and the acquisition of some kind of rationality which, actually, can 
never be taken for granted. The difference between the aforementioned view  of 
Castoriadis, and thinkers who defend the human ‘immaturity’ hypothesis, is that for 
the former this view  does not serve as a pretext for political sovereignty and 
                                                          
13 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, (The Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge/ Mass./ 
London: Harvard University Press/ W. Heinemann, 1926. 
14 Plato, Phaedo, trans. David Galop, (Oxford World’s Classics), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
15 Even if there cannot be found an innate sociability in the Castoriadian thought like in Aristotle, yet 
when Castoriadis advocates that the human being is not ‘born’ but rather ‘becomes’, his perspective could 
be defined as Aristotelian, taking into account that nature in Aristotle is not exhausted in birth but is 
defined by the vocation, that is the end (telos/ τέλος), which is identified with the “form”.     
16 C., Castoriadis, Lectures in Greece (Οι ομιλίες στην Ελλάδα), Athens: Ιpsilon, 2000, p. 56. Translation 
mine. 
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psychological paternalism. For Castoriadis this kind of human condition is always to be 
transcended, as during the process of maturation the human being develops the 
capacity of liberation. Therefore, it can be said that this ‘autistic’ insanity is not ‘nature’ 
in the sense of an unsurpassable obstacle or a permanent mental state; since the human 
being has been also endowed with the ability of alloiosis that is self-alteration and self-
invention.  
SUBLIMATION IN A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The basic precondition of self-alteration is the process of sublimation as the particular 
psychic process of humanization of the being. This process is taken not to be coming to 
an end with adulthood but to be unfolding over the whole span of a person’s life. 
Therefore, sublimation is considered as the psychic process which enables socialization. 
As such, it is  also related to politics, as well as  to the project of autonomy as 
introduced by Castoriadis. Sublimation can be acknowledged  as the meeting point of 
nature and civilization, or nature and culture. The automatic function of desire is 
constituted through sublimatory investment by the phantasmatic or representational 
pleasure. Thus, human sexuality appears not as functional neither as abstract 
spiritualization but instead as a matter of pleasure of phantasy. Therefore, the 
instinctual self is transformed, and human imagination grows as independent of the 
drive, while this transition becomes “functional” in another sense;17 ensuring the 
survival and the progress of the subject, which otherwise would have been obstructed 
by the prevalence of the absolute character of the nature of drives.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that sublimation in psychoanalytic terms represents the 
idiogenetic process of socialization, it also adopts an ontological status  which consists 
in the process of creation of the self, in the sense that it constitutes  a species, a 
particular form of being. This ontological creation, for Castoriadis, does not merely 
correspond to the material form of the being as  constituted by molecules etc. But even 
in this level of “material” formation – since what is material is not yet after all 
ultimately  defined – it can be suggested that being is in a process of a never ending 
becoming. The human being is not born as a static  identity, but it ‘becomes’ through 
interaction with the institutional agency and cultural factors, until the end of its life. 
Therefore, the primal psychic energy is in multiple ways reshaped and formulated by 
the social. The latter  subdues the natural tendency for omnipotence. Through the 
psychic separation which emerges from connecting   with others, socialization emerges 
as a violent rupture which restraints the rampant imaginative force. The feeling of 
                                                          
17 S. Gourgouris, “On Self-Alteration”, Parhesia, vol. 9, 2010, pp. 1-17. 
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omnipotence on the part of the subject is sacrificed in favor of the pleasure of 
community; it is exchanged for the sake of  security of the Ego and constitution of 
meaning (Castoriadis, 1987, 302). From this twofold aspect of sublimation, therefore, 
stems on the one hand, the critique of civilization as repressive of the human drives and 
the deeper needs of the psyche in favor of the goals of productivity and maximization, 
resulting to an unsatisfactory psychic life, while, on the other hand, sublimation 
appears to be the fundamental precondition of the greatest manifestations of human 
intelligence, the most attractive forms of aesthetic and mental creation. Both aspects 
were initially expressed as such by Freud.   
Freud’s difficulty in finding a resolution to the contradiction between the 
phylogenetic and socio-historical nature of the human being, has often lead to the 
perception of sublimation by psychoanalysts and theoreticians as a pathological 
condition which renders the human being pathological by nature. When encountering  
the dichotomy between libidinal repression and progress of civilization, Freud 
comprehends libidinal potential as something that has to be abandoned for the sake of 
the progress of civilization.18 Freud's noted pessimism leads him to acknowledge 
repression as a necessary condition for the growth of the civilized society. Therefore, he 
cannot avoid the politically conservative consequences of his position and the 
skepticism toward any emancipating imperative. It is a significant predicament of the 
Freudian psychology of the personality that the (supposed healthy) Ego, assigned to 
govern the unconscious desire, takes over the decisive role to dominate the unconscious 
as well as the Superego with the latter representing society’s conscious agency within 
the individual. This hierarchical organization of internal principles or aspects of the 
personality entails a dual repression, upon the Id, as well as upon the Superego. Hence, 
in Freud’s later work, as Castoriadis points out, a shift from the Superego to the Ego as 
the locus of society’s conscious agency can be noticed. The heteronomous ego becomes 
the locus of a heteronomous sublimation in a broader social-cultural context.19 In this 
respect, Castoriadis, contrasting himself to Freud, elaborates a resolution, taking 
sublimation not as a proto-formative process but as a practico-poietical activity and 
designating it not merely as of psychoanalytic importance but as fundamentally 
engaging in politics.  
                                                          
18 For a political critique of Freud’s solution to the problem of drives, and the civilizational repression 
from the perspective of the Critical Theory, H. Marcuse, 1974 and J. V. Ocay, “Eroticizing Marx, 
Revolutionizing Freud: Marcuse’s Psychoanalytic Turn”, Kritike, vol. 3, no. 1, June 2009, pp. 10-23.   
19 See S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, New York – London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961, and 
The Ego and the Id: and Other Works, Standard ed., London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-
analysis, 1961. 
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Since the human survival and socialization would be prevented by the insatiable 
nature of human desire, sublimation is rendered an intrinsic feature and basic element 
of humanization, a prerequisite for survival and socialization. Therefore,  sublimation 
does not necessarily constitute “civilization” in the context of an internalization of the 
superego type precepts within the person; it rather constitutes an autopoietic quality.  
From the perspective of the primal psychic core that, urged by the pleasure principle, 
rejects the nature of reality, and resists the abandonment of omnipotence, sublimation 
would appear as a heteronomous rule or as an external principle, which imposes itself 
by force. Whereas from the perspective of  psyche’s imaginative ability, that depends on 
the imaginative flux of representations, sublimation appears as  psyche’s cultural 
capacity. Therefore, it seems that the capacity for interpreting society’s significations 
into psychic terms, which is activated by sublimation, is an inherent attribute of the 
psyche that may provide the psyche with an amount of pleasure, which in turn is able 
to counterbalance the feeling of lack caused by separation. Thereby, the innate 
imaginative capacity of the psyche renders possible the human historical and cultural 
creation (Castoriadis, 1987, 2000).  
Thus, with Castoriadis’s attempt to clarify the conditions under which sublimation 
activates an altered, distinctive way of connecting to reality, to the extent that it is not 
restricted to sole passive internalization of societal imaginative significances, 
sublimation is turned from a psychoanalytic problem to a political one. This is so 
because psychoanalysis may partly reveal the conditions which enable the 
rationalization that is presupposed for sublimation, but cannot define the object due to 
which the shift of the drive (trieb) occurs, the roots of sublimation are socio-historical. 
This means that the cause for the emergence of sublimation is found in the social-
historical field.20 The psychoanalytic topic proves to be profoundly political, since it is 
related to the formation of subjectivity and power relations. It the following sections, it 
will be defined the way in which subjectivity is related to power through 
psychoanalysis. It will also be explicated, how Castoriadis comprehends liberation from 
psychic heteronomy, and in what way this understanding is connected to social 
autonomy. However, it is important to remain for a while in Castoriadis’s ontology, and 
analyze the psyche as constituted by the radical imaginary that is, according to his 
analysis, deeply embedded within the human being.   
 
 
                                                          
20 C. Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, MIT Press, 1984, p. 38. 
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THE “PRAXIS” OF REFLECTION AND VOLITIONAL ACTIVITY: THE RISE 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The dialectic of psyche and society in Castoriadis is a basic element upon which he 
founds the ontological premises of autonomy. As stated above, in the Castoriadian 
approach, psyche and society are related dialectically. Their connection is structured 
upon the ancient dialectic of physis (φύσις) and nomos (νόμος). Castoriadis uses this 
scheme as a resolution to the tension between phylogenetic and socio-historical human 
nature, or the biological and the humane which in Freud remains unresolved (see 
Castoriadis, 2001). The basic concept that applies to the human psyche is the radical 
imagination. This concept  expresses the innate and independent character of the 
psyche. Nevertheless, for Castoriadis an absolute physis without nomos is inconceivable.21  
The psyche is defined, on the one hand, by the process of socialization, and, on the 
other hand, by multiplicity. By the latter it is implied that the psyche is energised by 
more than one, and often contradictory, factors; provided that the psyche does not 
respond to the function of a determined system or a specified logic, but it rather 
corresponds with what Castoriadis calls a magma (Castoriadis, 1987, 321). This means 
that it always involves indeterminacy, and in fact this attributes to the psyche a great 
level of independence. This ability of psychic independence enables a kind of 
‘resistance’ to social assimilation. This occurs by maintaining the internal schism that 
produces the difference, and gives rise to the internal otherness, which is dependent on 
the creation of the radical imaginary (Gourgouris, 2010). This arising could lead to 
pathological effects but may as well be the source of a relatively autonomous 
organisation of personality which succeeds in integrating multiplicity in a creative 
fashion. It is the psyche’s need for symbolic meaning that constitutes the dialectic 
interaction of psyche and society. Therefore, the subject is formed in a socio-historical 
context with the contribution of significations offered by societal institution. But just as 
a subject would appear as ‘empty’ without the socio-historical context and significance, 
the social imaginary significations can be meaningless, without a subject to constitute 
them. This relation is interdependent and appears to consist in alterity. And this 
alteration does not appear once but frequently in one’s lifetime. The social imaginary 
institution is invested by the subject in order to live as a social being. However, the 
subject is not and will never be reducible to a whole set of instituted significations 
(Gourgouris, 2010). This thesis brings  on the focus of the psychoanalytic process the 
objective of the construction of an – as much as possible – conscious relation with one’s 
                                                          
21 On the ancient Greek problematic of physis and nomos in respect to the distinction of anthropic self-
institution and natural norm in Castoriadis’s thought, S. Adams, “Castoriadis’ Long Journey through 
Nomos: Institution, Creation, Interpretation”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie vol. 70, 2008, pp. 269-295. 
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inner multidimensional reality. In this respect, there is not an a priori unification of the 
subject, but also, for Castoriadis an absolute unification in terms of erasing difference 
can never be totally successful. The subject is in this context perceived dynamically, as 
a being-in-formation, in position to receive some forms of meaning on the condition of 
developing a view of one’s self in a willing and reflective way.  
Psychoanalysis presupposes the recognition that an essential transformation of the 
subject is attainable, and this is the most significant statement as far as this 
anthropology is concerned. This position  entails that the specific activity of self-
alteration is not fulfilled with the activity of the analytical process as such, but it rather 
complies with another objective, which does not preexist, and cannot be actualized 
only by the mediation of ‘nature’. The human subjectivity in this case becomes the 
means as well as the goal of self-alteration. Human volition, stemming from desire, is 
the basic agency that can succeed in putting into effect the Freudian transformation 
consisting in “Where there was It, it is I that has to become”. This alteration does not 
concern a cognitive shift but a praxis (πράξις) and poiesis (ποιείν). The particular idea  
follows the traditional Aristotelian precept, and aims at a transformation of what is 
(είναι) towards what one can become (δύνασθαι-είναι) (Castoriadis, 1984, 13-14). This 
premise sets in the core essence of Castoriadis’s anthropology two attributes of the 
human subjectivity as such: the reflective contemplation and the volitional activity, which are 
defined as the essential potential of the human being.22 In Castoriadis’s understanding 
of the psychoanalytic process as well as in his philosophico-anthropological thinking, 
the reflective activity holds a central role, not exactly one that can absolutely attain 
reality in a scientific manner constituting an objective condition as such, but as an 
endless questioning and imperative which resists absolute identifications and 
attachment to prefixed ideas and constructions; it is, therefore, presented as an 
imperative and a profound philosophical activity which forms what Castoriadis defines 
as the “thinking process”.23 Even so, thinking is understood as never exempted from 
unconscious. It is rather a mixture of conscious and unconscious elements (Castoriadis, 
1997). 
Nevertheless, when it comes to questioning the deeper motives of an action, in 
spite of the difficulty which is involved in rendering it an object of contemplation by the 
                                                          
22 C. Castoriadis, ‘‘The State of the Subject Today’’, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, 
Psychoanalysis and the Imagination, Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 137-171. 
23 The conscious mind in Castoriadis is not restricted to the simple process of computing or rational 
process of thought as Hobbes had put it, nor is narrowed to the process of the conscious self to calculate, 
adjust and compromise among the various psychic principles, like Freud tended to comprehend it. It is 
more related to what can be called a mindful condition and a lucid state of mind.    
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conscious mind, this cannot be acknowledged only as a philosopher’s capacity, but it 
constitutes the minimum capacity required by the analyzed person: one has to be able, 
by means of her or his representative capacity, to discriminate that something is what it 
is, and is not something else. At the same time, this process cannot be merely 
dependent on noetic function or institutional factors, but is instead to an extent a semi-
intuitional ability and presupposes spontaneity. A condition of the categorical ability of 
contemplative reflection is imaginative force or phantasia (φαντασία), which by its 
boundless extension permits the subject to see one’s own self as such and 
simultaneously as “somebody else” (Castoriadis, 1997).24  
In a fundamental gnosiotheoretical level, perception is creation, restricted, 
however, by the fact that this process is usually an unconscious creation. This inherent 
imaginative principle is responsible for both distortion of reality and false perception as 
well as for art and various unique ways of being of singularities. From the intrinsic 
creative imagination stems also the intentional ability  to transform the phenomenal 
reality or  to change the actual ‘reality’ principle. However, the change of perception of 
our representation of the world precedes. According to Castoriadis, when someone is 
able to imagine something different than what-there-is, this person is able to change 
the object of desire. To desire something else than what-there-is liberates the 
imagination (Castoriadis, 1997). One may put it as opening and expanding of the virtual 
in the constitution of the actual (although these would be Deleuzian terms which do not 
apply as such in Castoriadis.)25 Nevertheless, one needs to be cautious while examining 
this position, for there is a thin but concrete line that diverges this process of alteration 
of reality according to the principle of imagination from the neurotic inability to accept 
reality as such which leads to fictitious gateways. The clear difference among the two 
will be defined in what follows; but what can be said in brief is that the type of 
perception which is discussed here entails praxis, and hence finally escapes the 
contradiction with ‘reality’. For the latter is transformed though ‘praxis’ as well as 
through alteration of the actual modality of the way of being within ‘reality’. The being 
thus reveals itself as infinite potentiality. 
To return to the previous point, according to Castoriadis, there is already a 
                                                          
24 By this it is meant that self-reference characterises the human being as in the way also of a specific 
comprehension of one’s own condition which enables the reflective contemplation.  
25 In Deleuze the ‘virtual’ is not opposed to the ‘real’ but to the ‘actual’; on the other hand, ‘real’ is 
opposed to ‘possible’. The virtual in Deleuze has a two-fold significance. It can be the phenomenal effect 
which emerges by causal factors interacting in the material level, whereas the second aspect is of a 
generative nature. Although not material as in the previous aspect, it can however be realized in the 
actual level. The virtual for Deleuze is understood as a continuous multiplicity with a particular duration - 
a notion that he derives from Bergson. See, G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, New York: Zone Books, 1991.   
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volitional activity when mind is concentrated into a single point in systematic and 
coherent way, and a reflection of the representation is what could be rendered the 
object of volitional activity. Volitional activity is not the simple “act” but the reflective 
perspective of what we are as imaginative beings beyond the scope of self-reference for 
the sake of self-preservation (Castoriadis, 1997). The contemplative reflection and the ability 
of volitional activity enable a different arrangement of the way conscious and unconscious 
self relate to each other. Hence the way in which this relation is formed constitutes in 
psychoanalytic terms the content of the human autonomy (Castoriadis, 1997). In other 
words, this relation refers to the possibility of freeing oneself from the influence of fixed 
preconceptions and the conformity of human experience.  
SOCIAL CONSTITUTION AS CONSCIOUS CREATION OF AUTONOMY 
What counts in the aforementioned context is the ability of questioning, clarifying or 
putting into our representative activity the motives or the causes of the act and the act 
itself, as a basic form of accountability of the person towards her or his self. But this 
activity would be pointless for Castoriadis without the ability of reflection beyond the 
limits set by the established societal system that is currently on power. This suggestion 
is related to the idea that an ethics of accountability which does not deviate from the 
norm, would probably point to an ethics imposed by external conditions, very likely to 
be linked to the Superego consciousness and intertwined with unconscious factors. 
However, this condition of liberating activity is dependent on the societal constitution 
as a historical creation,26 and must in some way be activated by it. Great historical 
paradigms of this type are autonomous societies which have appeared throughout 
history as expressions of people’s creativity and will, aiming to constitute a common 
field of free action and participation.27 Autonomous can be called a society that is able to 
demonstrate a kind of collective awareness concerning the fact that society itself is the 
source of its own existence and formation, that is the society holds the awareness of 
                                                          
26 See H. Joas, R. Meyer, “Review Essay: Institutionalisation as a Creative Process: The Sociological 
Importance of Cornelius Castoriadis’s Political Philosophy”, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 94, no. 5, 
Mar.1989, pp. 1184-1199.   
27 For Castoriadis a model of this kind is ancient Greek democracy. However, he emphasizes that this is a 
paradigm to be taken into account, but not one to be blindly imitated. Another example comes from the 
autonomous communities of the late medieval period in the western world. Nevertheless, no matter how 
important the tradition of autonomy was, finally, modernity took a totally different form as it was 
dominated by two contrasting and intertwining imaginative significations: autonomy and sovereignty in 
the context of instrumental rationality. C. Castoriadis, The Ancient Greek Democracy and its Relevance for Us 
Today (Η Αρχαία Ελληνική Δημοκρατία και η Σημασία της για Μας Σήμερα), Ipsilon/ Vivlia, 
Athens, 1999, and “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy”, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 
vol. 9 no. 2, Fall 1983, pp. 79-185. 
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being self-constituting and, therefore, as a socio-historical domain it creates its own 
significances, values, norms, laws etc. This occurs not because all these are imposed by 
a sovereign, but because the inherited social significances have come under open 
questioning and discussion, so that society allows  the rise of new forms (of life, being, 
art, thought, politics, and in general, creation). In that case, one may speak of a shift 
from the instituted to the instituting which appears whenever an era of philosophical 
questioning combined with democratic politics has taken place.28 Hence, Castoriadis 
sets with his philosophy the Politics of Autonomy as a social condition of an instituting 
“openness” in position to bring about the rupture of the current “closeness” of the 
instituted significances.  
In the very opposite case of non-autonomous societies, what is present is perceived 
as if it has always been there, as if given from God. The society’s members are 
alienated by societal institutions, which cannot be easily “touched”, and which actually 
function as the primeval form of taboo of primitive society. The citizens, unaware of 
their capacity to change the inherited social order which was once constituted by 
another society, and which may have served its needs but does not anymore, become 
separated from customs, meanings and institutions that paradoxically continue to serve 
and participate in a meaningless ghostly way. Institutions could be changed and 
become a subject of active creation and alive participation, if they could be realized as 
people’s own possible creation. While by not realizing this possibility, the citizens of a 
heteronomous society abdicate their creative capacity and power, feeding into 
inequality and injustice. Castoriadis himself could acknowledge this inability in his 
contemporary society. He used thus to call the western democracies of our times 
“democratic oligarchies” (Castoriadis, 2000, 119), because the citizen in the context of 
political mechanisms in liberal democracies is deprived of accessibility to political 
decision-making. This development has taken place in the contradictory scene within 
which the liberal democracies have taken shape: liberty and control. That is under the 
liberal outlook of “absolute freedom of choice”, the capitalistic ideology inspires 
conformism, passivity and control, determining since modernity, through the 
intertwining of politics and economic interests, the forms of life to dominate and those 
to be marginalized. Michel Foucault has analyzed in depth this aspect of liberal and 
neoliberal societies, and has shown how controls are exercised by mechanisms of 
                                                          
28 Castoriadis has been criticized for his Greco-western centrality with the argument that he 
underestimates or excludes the potentialities of other kinds of societies all over the world which 
throughout history might have achieved equivalent accomplishments. For this critique, see J.P. Arnason, 
“Culture and Imaginary Significations”, Thesis Eleven vol. 22, 1989, pp. 25-45, and S. Adams, “Arnason 
and Castoriadis’ Unfinished Dialogue: Articulating the World”, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 14, no. 
1, 2011, pp. 71-88. 
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subjection and, progressively, by mechanisms of biopolitical concern.29 
The above analysis by Castoriadis follows a thin balance that resembles to an 
extent the Foucauldian approach which, without rejecting sovereignty’s effects and 
power’s ability to direct society in a macro-scale analysis, attributes the foundations of 
the preservation of political power also to the perception and customs of  the micro-
scale factor of the subjectivity.30 There is a difference however between the two in the 
method for resolution and emancipation. While Castoriadis traces the means of 
liberation in a radical understanding of psychoanalysis, Foucault goes back to ancient 
Greek philosophy as a way of life and stresses the necessity for  revival of spiritual ways 
of constituting the subjectivity under contemporary terms and conditions. For 
Castoriadis, to the extent that people are not aware of their power, society as much as 
individuals are bound to perpetuate the unconscious chain of repression. This 
heteronomous state  could be ruptured only by  means of some kind of a revolutionary 
action, - an act of freedom, or an act of creating this freedom, and also the praxis that 
can take place under the conditions of the freedom which has already been created - 
while later a broader understanding on the part of Castoriadis upon this notion would 
set it as creative collective political action.31 This rupture may emerge on condition that the 
singularity of the personal creative imagination is able to transcend the socially 
featured model, and become itself the beginning for the vitiation of an institution or its 
reformation. Such an action could obviously not emanate from agents who place 
society’s laws and institutions beyond question.  
THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF SELF-ALTERATION AS AUTO-POIESIS: THE 
RISE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 
The term sublimation was implemented by Freud aiming to reflect on the content of a 
healthy – that is with less implications of contradiction and suppression  as possible – 
socialization, and this content should not be confused or identified with metathesis. Yet 
what Castoriadis means, when he refers to sublimation, implies an internal metamorphosis 
which raises two questions: the first on the final cause and the second on the way or the 
means of succeeding it. Concerning the first, to point to the social demands as 
projections of what the subject should be formed into in order to fit into the social 
norms, would be totally discrepant from the ends of psychoanalysis, as Castoriadis 
                                                          
29 See respectively, M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books, 
1995, and The Birth of Biopolitics, New York & Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
30 See M. Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth I, New York: The New Press, 1997, pp. 281-301. 
31 H. Joas, The Creativity of action, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 115. 
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defines them. Inconsistent with his understanding of the means of succeeding the 
personal transformation would be also to conceive technique, in the strict sense of the 
term, as a means for this goal . The technical approach would have a meaning, in case 
we could speak of “laws of function of the psychic mechanism” (which unsuccessfully 
Freud aimed to discover). But as Castoriadis puts it, and as probably Jung would, the 
subject of psychoanalysis resists stylization. There is something elusive about the 
psyche, its boundless and abyssal nature that renders it indeterminate. The subject of 
psychoanalysis, psyche, is for Castoriadis, “radical imagination, indeterminate 
creativity, is a possible object of thought, of elucidation – but not of ‘science’” 
(Castoriadis, 1984, 97). The term ‘science’ here refers to the conventional positivistic 
content of the term. The previous statement does not direct toward an “unscientific” 
approach, but it is rather an expression of objection to the nineteenth and twentieth 
century’s positivism, as it was applied in psychoanalysis, and as Freud himself expressed 
it. Conformism and technique are rejected because of corresponding, according to 
Castoriadis, to an aspect of the psychoanalytic School that fully complies with the 
features of the given socio-historical world, forcing thus the individuals to fit into these 
features as they are taken for health and balance indicators.32   
Moreover, the content of the final cause is of great significance. Castoriadis ascribes 
to Freud’s suggestion that the Id has to become an I, two perspectives or alternatives. 
The Ego will either have to be led to a social norm, namely to a compromise between 
the instinctive desires and the social demands, or it would have to be transformed into 
a philosophical self. Generally,  it is more likely that the first scenario will prevail. In 
that case, psychoanalysis is a tool which assists the subject, by trying to relieve the most 
irritating symptoms of psychological imbalances, to adapt to the society as such. This 
trend is met in a tenuous aspect of psychoanalysis, while, psychoanalysis can be also 
characterized  as a movement which critically questions the manifestations of the social 
world (see Castoriadis, 1984). These ‘manifestations’ are actually creations 
characterized by  collective archetypes of control, oppression and solidification 
transferred through covered manufactured meanings that appear to the individual 
consciousness as a naturalized reality, as ‘physis’.  
Consequently, speaking of transformation within the psychoanalytic process as a 
practico-poietical activity (ποιεῖν–πράττειν), and referring to an end of the process, does 
not imply an end, according to which the subject leads her or his conscious mind in 
dominion over the unconscious. What is more, this process is not based on the 
imposition of the supposed authority of an analyst, who, even though present, never 
                                                          
32 And again here can be seen a parallel with Foucault’s critique of psychiatry and its mechanisms, and 
also the movement of Anti-Psychiatry.  
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expresses himself upon a “patient” or a “client”, the latter being considered passive as 
well.33 Self-alteration as a creative self-deformation or autoalloiosis (αυτο-αλλοίωσις) 
emerges as an imperative within the intersubjective connection of the analyst with the 
person who is analysed. As far as concerns the intentions of the analyst, the supposed 
“scientific neutrality” is abandoned. The process is invested in the creative capacity of 
the analysed person, to co-activate with the analyst, and proceed to, the poietical 
creation of the self. The creative self-deformation in this process is reciprocal and is 
activated  for both of them. Therefore, the analyst without taking the position of an 
indifferent leading expert, ought to accompany the analysed person to a reinvention 
and recreation of the self, aiming at his autonomy in terms of psychological 
determination, so that one would attain the unfolding of his creative powers and an 
opening to the “capability of love”34 (Castoriadis, 1984). 
Furthermore, the psychoanalytic process can be also perceived as an inner process 
of self-analysis and reflection in an attempt to elucidate one’s psychic condition and 
motivation, without entailing necessarily in this process the presence of another person. 
However, in respect to  the above analysis, it is important to keep in mind the 
difference between elucidation and theorization. Castoriadis defines thinking as clarifying 
not theorizing. The aim of the analysis in this context is to establish an alternative way 
of relating to the self, not in terms of a split but in terms of sustaining clarity. The aim 
of the analysis is also to establish a different mode of relating to the self and the 
“Other”. This premise is applied in a twofold direction: the intention is to direct the 
unconscious self to expression of one’s own truth, which would enable a more profound 
understanding of the internal otherness, and also to direct the conscious self not to 
“authority” or “sovereignty” but to lucidity, and to the activity that opens up to the 
possibility of decision and truthfulness. Priority of psychoanalytic process should be 
liberation from the bonds of repression - not understood in an absolute manner but as 
a moment to moment process, and by no means in terms of dominion upon the 
                                                          
33 Castoriadis’s approach on psychoanalysis as a process of self-creation and as potential self-
transformation with the reciprocal shift of the person who is being analysed and the analyst, is developed 
as a critique of the Lacanian school of psychoanalysis which, for Castoriadis, establishes the analyst in 
position of a passive authority (see Castoriadis, 1984, 3-118). Castoriadis has conducted an acidulous 
critique on Lacan, starting from the understanding of imaginary which in Castoriadis is broader as related 
to representation. A. Elliott, “Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and the Politics of Post-modernity. Anthony 
Elliott talks with Sean Homer” in Social Theory since Freud: Traversing Social Imaginaries, Abington: Routledge, 
pp. 158-171. For a brief critique on Castoriadis from the Lacanian angle see: C. Strauss, “The Imaginary”, 
Anthropological Theory vol. 6, no. 3, 2006, pp. 322-344, and Y. Stavrakakis, “Creativity and its Limits: 
Encounters with Social Constructionism and the Political in Castoriadis and Lacan”, Constellations vol. 9 
no. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 522-539. 
34 Freud considered the inability to love an essential factor in neurosis and he related it to repression. 
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unconscious. For Castoriadis complete transparency of the self or absolute guiding 
power of reason (ratio) cannot be succeessful. Therefore, the Freudian imperative 
“where there was Id, is I that has to become”, should be complemented by the 
imperative, “where I (Ego) am (is), that (Id) should also emerge” (Castoriadis, 2000, 88-
89).35  
According to this perspective, the Ego is not any more the sole “administrator” of 
personality, as a substitute of the Superego that depends solely in social-imaginary 
institution in order to derive meaning. It becomes the locus which features the creative 
and destructive forces of the unconscious as a liberating field that permits those forces 
to emerge and manifest, instead of being repressed as in one way or another the 
traditional psychoanalysis would suggest. The particular content of autonomy in this 
case consists in the imperative to transform the overpowering reason of the I into the 
reason of the Other, in order to stop it from dominating as an absolute principle which 
subdues the unconscious realm, the realm of instinct, feeling, dream and desire. The 
obviation of the alienation from psychic life itself, and the empowerment of 
consciousness in a much broader sense of the term, gives rise to the expression of 
autonomy at a personal level. This transmutation implies the shift in the way 
sublimation takes place, and, furthermore entails the alteration of the subject’s actual 
history as perpetual continuum of the human thought and praxis. 
CONCLUSION 
The reference to an “ending” of the psychoanalytic process (which, as mentioned, for 
Castoriadis can never be considered as absolute and final) points to an enunciation and 
affirmation of the condition of human autonomy. The ability of a conscious alteration 
of the way the individual relates to the world as well as to the societal constitution itself, 
depends on the possible capacity for  transmutation of the energy of the psyche and 
mind.36 According to Castoriadis, the human being is chaos, is abyss, but it is also 
characterized by a revolutionary potential for creativity. This potentiality could lead to 
liberation from the slavery of mimesis and the unconscious action, the mechanical 
reproduction of the unconscious urges and the inherited tradition, to the extent that 
the latter leads to passivity, and is internalized without conscious participation. The 
                                                          
35 Translation mine. 
36 The subject’s capacity to think on this law, and to critically examine it by rejecting an ideology of 
adjustment to what there is, emerges partly from the realisation of the eventuality of the historical 
contingency (which, nonetheless tends to be perceived as a social necessity), and it is dependent as well on 
the fundamental difference between a sublimation that leads to an imaginary social object, and a 
sublimation that transcends it (Castoriadis, 1984, 39). 
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Castoriadian anthropology opposes itself to the schools of science and philosophy 
which are obstructed by the concept of human nature, when it comes to formulating 
positions concerning the possibility of an institutional change of society. Castoriadis 
was in fact trying to articulate the terms and preconditions - in a psychological and 
ontological as well as in a socio-political context - of the institutional constitution of the 
society towards autonomy, solidarity and direct democracy. In his perception, societal 
institution and history itself reveal themselves as creations of the collective imaginary. And 
in this respect, the emancipating imperative of psychoanalysis corresponds to the quest 
for political autonomy. With the hypothesis of an “end” of the psychoanalytic process, 
the aspiration for emancipation of internal and external alienation and a release from 
conditions of control and passivity arise. Castoriadis’s fundamental concept of human 
existence directs us towards a dynamic perception of self-reflective and capable for 
decision making human beings, who by means of their creative imaginary power are 
possibly in position of undertaking the project of autonomy. That is to constitute new 
forms of subjectivities, alternative models of coexistence and experimental forms of 
collectives.  
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